AS EL Salvador transitions from decades of conservative rule to the administration of leftist president Mauricio Funes, the country faces an international showdown that will likely determine how free trade agreements impact Central America’s future. Pacific Rim Mining Corporation, a Canadian multinational firm, has brought suit against the government for its refusal to allow exploitation of gold deposits in El Salvador’s rural north. Should Pacific Rim succeed in securing the $100 million settlement it seeks, a troubling precedent would be set—one that privileges private interests over national sovereignty.

Pacific Rim initiated arbitration proceedings against El Salvador with the World Bank’s International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) on April 30. The corporation argues that El Salvador violated its Chapter 10 responsibilities under the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) by refusing to issue exploitation permits after Pacific Rim filed an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in accordance with national law. The corporation insists that their operations pose no threat whatsoever to El Salvador’s ecological stability and public health.
Social activists and environmental experts disagree. They contend that Pacific Rim’s EIA offers little evidence supporting the company’s “green mining” claims and that it serves as a smokescreen to obscure the adverse socioeconomic impacts gold mining is likely to produce in the small, densely populated nation. Thus far, the social movement against precious metal mining in El Salvador has succeeded in compelling the government to resist Pacific Rim’s advances. But questions remain concerning Funes’ resolve to stand defiant in the face of international pressure.
Pacific Rim began exploring the country’s potential for gold exploitation nearly seven years ago, charting a vein system that covers considerable portions of El Salvador’s northern reaches. The corporation commenced operations at the invitation of the government’s Ministries of the Economy and the Environment, which issued exploration permits in 2002 under the neoliberal administration of Francisco Flores. Since then, the corporation has identified some twenty-five sites for gold extraction across seven national departments, and invested upwards of $80 million in the process.
As exploration increased, however, so did the alarm of environmentalists and the Salvadoran population at the potentially adverse effects that gold mining could have on the country. Of chief concern, critics point to the threat of water and soil contamination from chemical residue in the wake of mining operations. Miners use cyanide-laced water to extract gold from subterranean rock, which, experts contend, makes its way back to reserves tapped for drinking. That all of Pacific Rim’s sites are located along the country’s longest river, the Lempa, has environmentalists especially worried.
These concerns were met with popular unrest that spawned a social movement, which has successfully attracted the attention of the Salvadoran government and garnered broad national and international support. With public opinion polls showing a clear majority in opposition to gold mining, ARENA (the ruling party at the time) refused to issue the company permits to begin extracting gold from underground deposits.
With its prospects at gaining permits grinding to a standstill within the government bureaucracy and opposition forces gaining the advantage locally, Pacific Rim filed a notice of intent in December 2008 to bring El Salvador in front of an international arbitration board to resolve the dispute. Specifically, the corporation claimed that El Salvador violated the spirit of nondiscrimination enshrined in Chapter 10 of the CAFTA agreement by allowing domestic companies to pollute while denying the same privilege to Pacific Rim.
CAFTA, which was signed by El Salvador in 2006, allows multinational corporations to sue Central American governments for cash compensation when their potential for profit has been undermined. But because Canada is not a signatory to CAFTA, Pacific Rim is not technically entitled to Chapter 10 protections as it claims. Nevertheless, the corporation routed the lawsuit through a backdoor: its American-based subsidiary Pacific Rim Cayman LLC.
EARLY INDICATIONS suggest that the new Funes administration will pursue a compromise solution instead of risking a costly settlement. “We’re not in a position to be losing litigation. That money should be allocated to social programs,” El Salvador’s Secretary of Technology Alex Segovia recently noted. Indeed, if the arbitration board rules in Pacific Rim’s favor, El Salvador would be profoundly crippled by the $100 million payout asked by Pacific Rim. Perhaps more troubling still, the verdict would send a signal to other multinationals in Central America that the law sides with corporate interests over the protection of local populations.
Nevertheless, a negotiated settlement offers equally disturbing possibilities. The most likely would be an amendment to environmental and mining laws, allowing foreign corporations easier access to El Salvador’s natural resource deposits. In all likelihood, the FMLN-sponsored anti-mining legislation would be shelved indefinitely and opportunities for peaceful resolution of local concerns increasingly foreclosed.
Pacific Rim’s lawsuit—along with the violent repression of recent protests in Peru—represents the latest example of failure by U.S.-sponsored trade regimes to bring prosperity and progress to the region. American policymakers acknowledge as much, as bilateral trade agreements with Panama and Colombia continue to stall and pressure to amend the North America Free Trade Agreement builds.
Yet the hope that the social movement against mining in El Salvador would find an ally in Barack Obama has been unrealized. During the campaign, Obama, who voted against the passage of CAFTA as a senator, spoke out passionately on the campaign trail against foreign trade agreements that privileged economic gain over the welfare of local populations under threat. But as president, Obama has failed to meaningfully act on an issue he himself acknowledges desperately demands attention and change.
The president reportedly will outline a new vision of equitable trade in a major speech later this year at the Group of 20 meeting in Pittsburgh. There, Obama will likely forge the plans for a free-trade architecture that would meet the president’s goal of preventing foreign corporations from “gaining economic advantage by destroying the environment” and “make clear that fair laws and regulations written to protect citizens…cannot be overridden at the request of foreign investors.”
But, by then, it could be too late for Salvadorans affected by Pacific Rim’s activities. If Funes and other like-minded “partners” throughout the region fail to stand up for these communities under threat, a regrettable precedent will be set—one that would invest even Obama’s most eloquent rhetoric with the hollow timbre of false promises.
Michael Busch is Research Associate at the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies and a doctoral student in political science at the Graduate Center, City University of New York.

In the coming months, the Legislative Assembly will begin to discuss and vote on  $1.5 billion in international loans negotiated by the Funes administration, designed to fund a variety of projects.  The votes of both primary parties—ARENA and the FMLN—are necessary for the 56 votes required to approve the loans and next year’s national budget.  However, ARENA’s legislative fraction announced on August 20 that it will not vote in favor of the loans unless the FMLN agrees to provide State financial support for San Salvador Mayor Norman Quijano’s Metrobus project, turn over three national movie theaters to ARENA mayors, and end the firing of federal employees.  In response, FMLN legislative deputy Norma Guevara told the Salvadoran press that her party is not “susceptible to extortion,” reminding ARENA of its promise to be a constructive opposition.

The Metrobus project was one of the primary campaign promises of Quijano, the recently elected mayor from the ARENA party, despite the fact that municipal mayors do not have authority over public transportation, which is regulated by the Vice-Ministry of Transport.  Funes has stated that he will not outright dismiss Quijano’s proposed project, but that comprehensive improvements to the national public transport system are necessary and there is no reason to limit a transport overhaul to San Salvador.  The government of Brazil has offered to provide credit and technical assistance to modernize the public transport fleet and revamp the entire system.  Regarding the demand to stop the firings of federal employees, Funes responded that it is simply false and there is no policy of mass firings in place.

ARENA has also been accused of orchestrating demonstrations, cloaked as community actions, resulting in blocked highways across the country during the last week of August.  The protesters claim Funes’ administration is not fulfilling its promise to distribute seeds and fertilizer and demand that these items be distributed immediately.  The Ministry of Agriculture is currently in the process of delivering 177,000 packets that contain 25 pounds of bean seeds and 100 pounds of fertilizer to farmers throughout the country.  There have been some delays in distribution,  generally due to the condition of the Ministry of Agriculture when Funes took office on June 1.  Farming equipment, seeds, fertilizer, and other supplies had been stolen from the Ministry—presumably by members of the previous administration—and the Ministry was therefore burdened with $15 million in debt.

The organizations participating in the road blocks include the General Agriculture Center (CEGAS) and the National Rural Agro-industrial Association (ANCA), both of which are recently created organizations.  Equipo Maiz, a popular education collective, pointed out the manner that the media has covered these demonstrations in a recent educational flyer.  “These protests were widely covered and praised by the major communication media, but this time without the typical qualifiers of ‘vandalism’ [used in most coverage of popular demonstrations],” read the flyer.  Salvadoran social movement leaders have expressed concern that the right-wing is organizing groups disguised as popular movements to destabilize the Funes administration.

On Monday, August 31, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hugo Martinez announced that the government of El Salvador will create a Commission for the Disappeared to investigate cases of children forcibly disappeared and separated from their families during the Civil War.  Martinez will ask President Mauricio Funes to decree an executive order for the creation of the Commission during the 15th anniversary celebration of the non-governmental organization Pro-Búsqueda.  Since 1994, Pro-Búsqueda has investigated cases of disappeared children and reunited 214 people with their families. Reyna Portillo of Pro-Búsqueda notes that this will mark the first time that their organization has had a relationship with the government.  

During the Civil War in El Salvador, the Armed Forces and other State security forces were responsible for the separation of many children from their families.  According to Pro-Búsqueda, some of these children were literally torn from the arms of their parents, although the majority became orphans after State-sponsored massacres and armed confrontations.  Such children, found amongst the cadavers following military massacres, were given away, sent abroad for adoption, or eventually put to work in the Armed Forces.  Martinez said that he believes that the government should recognize its responsibility to the separated families.  He explained that previous administrations refused to acknowledge the disappearances and he emphasized the importance of these investigations for the historical memory of the country.  “Forgetting is laying the groundwork for other boys and girls in our country to continue being [forcibly] disappeared,” said Martinez.

Since the beginning of the construction of the El Chaparral dam in October of 2008, local community members have mobilized against the dam.  Recently, the communities have camped out in front of the Presidential Home, shut down portions of the Panamerican Highway, and demonstrated at the dam construction site, demanding that President Mauricio Funes halt the dam’s construction.  The Executive Lempa River Commission (CEL) is the autonomous government institution in charge of the execution of the hydro-electric dam.

The project was begun during the administration of President Tony Saca and is being financed by a $163 million loan from the Central American Economic Integration Bank (BCIE) as well as a $56 million contribution from the State.  It is located in the north of the department of San Miguel near the municipalities of San Antonio del Mosco, San Luis de la Reina, and Sesori.  Members of these communities oppose the dam project and say it will flood and destroy valuable farmland, thereby displacing many families that reside near the site.  They also criticize the project’s bidding process and the manner in which construction was conceded to the Italian-based Astaldi Construction Corporation.

On July 22, over 200 citizens of nearby municipalities protested outside the construction site and met with El Salvador’s Human Rights Ombudsman, Oscar Luna.  Luna has called on the government to thoroughly review the project and offered to mediate between the communities and government officials.  He cited a report released by the Electricity and Telecommunications General Superintendence (SIGET) that concluded that the dam’s construction should be suspended due to the controversial nature of the dam and the likelihood for conflict if construction continues at this time.  The report cites many irregularities including: anomalies in the bidding and concession process, failure to conduct a thorough consultation with the surrounding communities, and deficiencies within the environmental impact report presented by the CEL.

On August 24, Vice-President and Minister of Education Salvador Sanchez Cerén officially opened the bidding process for some 7 million yards of fabric for the production of school uniforms, as the first step towards implementation of President Mauricio Funes’ plan to distribute two school uniforms, one pair of shoes, and a set of school supplies to every public school student in the country.  The program will not only benefit 1,360,000 students, but will also create jobs for small- and medium-sized Salvadoran businesses.  Fabric will be purchased from Salvadoran businesses and production will be carried out at a local level, with each municipality contracting local businesses and collectives to make the uniforms for their students.Sanchez Cerén also inaugurated the expansion of the school meal program at a public school in the town of Soyapango this past August.  The previous school meal program was limited to rural areas with high incidences of poverty, whereas the newly extended program includes students in impoverished urban areas as well. An additional 452,856 students in kindergarten through ninth grade in 764 schools will benefit from the expansion, raising the total students participating on a national level to 1,310,286 at 4,931 schools.   The school meal program provides a daily serving of rice, beans, oil, sugar, milk, and a fortified drink to students.Meanwhile, on July 31, Funes distributed property titles for small farming lots to over 900 families living throughout the department of La Paz  at a ceremony in the Zacatecoluca municipality. Funes attended a second ceremony in Izalco, Sonsonate on August 14 and presented titles to 489 additional families.  The families have been living on and cultivating State-owned lands, many for decades, without official property titles to their lots.  One of Funes’ campaign promises was the presentation of these titles, which then allows these families to be eligible for loans, technical assistance, and government projects and programs.  These ceremonial presentations represent the first steps in Funes’ promise to deliver 3,500 property titles in his first 100 days as president.

During the second half of the seventies each of these five organisations separately utilised different forms of struggle – armed, political electoral, economic and social. This accelerated the maturation of the national crisis. The triumph of the Sandinista Popular Revolution in Nicaragua, on July 19, 1979, and the coup d’etat in El Salvador on October 15, 1979 stimulated the need for the unification of the revolutionary left. The coup d’etat created a revolutionary situation in El Salvador.
On December 17, 1979, at the peak of the national crisis, the FPL, the RN and the PCS made the first agreement to unite, and created the CPM (Political-Military Coordinator), whose first manifesto was presented publicly on January 10, 1980. The possibility was left open for rest of the left wing organizations to join. The manifesto proclaimed the democratic character of the revolution, its historical foundations, the socialist direction of the revolution and the immediate programmatic contents.
On January 11, 1980 the CRM (Revolutionary Coordinator of Masses), was constituted, and included the following organizations:

a) BPR (Revolutionary Popular Block), of the FPL, formed on July 30, 1975;
b) FAPU (the Unified Grassroots Action Front), of the RN, formed in September 1974;
c) LP-28 (28 of February People’s League) of the ERP, formed in March 1977, after the peoples fights against the electoral fraud of February 1977;
d) UDN (the Nationalistic Democratic Union) the legal political party used by the PCS for the electoral-political struggle, and the creation of the coalition UNO (National Opposition Union), with the PDC (Christian Democratic Party), and MNR (National Revolutionary Movement). This organisation had adhered to social democracy, and is the coalition which won the Presidential elections of February of 1972 and 1977 – electoral victories that were snatched by frauds of the military dictatorship; and
e) the PRTC (Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers) was formed in April 1975 and in 1979 it was transformed into the MLP (Movement of Popular Liberation). It was then integrated the CRM with all the other organizations of the revolutionary left.

In parallel, at the beginning of March 1980, advances were made in the construction of the FDS (Salvadoran Democratic Front), with the following organisations: MIPTES (Independent Movement of Professionals and Technicians of El Salvador), MPSC (Social Christian Peoples Movement), an important breakaway from the PDC, MNR (National Revolutionary Movement), of the Socialist International; Union Federations; small industrialists as well as political and social personalities and groups of retired military. This included Colonel Ernesto Claramont who was the presidential candidate of the UNO in 1977. As affiliate observers were: The University of El Salvador and the Central American University “Jose Simeón Canes “.

The FDR (Revolutionary Democratic Front) was born from the unification of the FDS and the CRM, which lasted 17 days. This organisation appeared publicly on April 17, 1980.

The DRU (Unified Revolutionary Leadership) body was constituted on May 22, 1980, with the participation of FPL, RN, ERP and PCS. Three members of the Political Committee came from each of these revolutionary parties. The manifesto said: “There will be in future a single leadership, a single military plan, a single political line”.

The FMLN was created on October 10, 1980, made up of the original four organizations and then, in December of that year, the PRTC joined. This decision preceded the launching of the General offensive of January 10, 1981, which is when the People’s Revolutionary War really began.
The unitary process was advanced by the deepening of the war, the increasing intervention of the US government and the rise of the social struggle. In May and June of 1985, the General Command, besides defining the fundamental aspects of the strategy and the program for the period, drafted the process to advance gradually towards a unified party and to assume a strategic alliance FMLN-FDR. All obstacles to the advance of the unitary process were overcome by the unanimity within the FMLN in all the key aspects of the struggle.
The unity became deeper and deeper. The member organizations stopped making own plans, and carried out the plans developed by the General Command. This shared line, common strategy and plans, continued up until the negotiated outcome of the war, the execution of the peace accords and – up to a certain point the general elections of 1994. In a race against the time, the FMLN had to transform its structures and forces that worked for a war, into structures and forces for a political and social struggle.

The opponents of the FMLN were sure that after disarming the FMLN would disappear. They maintained that its force rested with its weapons. During this time the right-wing strived to ensure that the FMLN was occupied fulfilling the peace accords. This was to neutralise the FMLNs forces for the electoral struggle in the “elections of the Century”, and to assure the right-wings strategic defeat of the FMLN and the revolution. In fact, quite the opposite happened.

After the long process of the revolutionary war, the task of forging a new party was not easy. It was necessary to overcome the wall of terror raised by more than sixty years of repression, the crafty attitudes of the right-wing politicians who wanted to prevent the legalisation of the FMLN as a political party, and the difficulties of the organisation of a party at a national level. The work was enormous. This organic process multiplied the membership of the FMLN by several times over and in a few months the FMLN became the second most important political party in the country.
THE STRUGGLES OF THE FMLN AS A POLITICAL PARTY
After overcoming the political obstacles, on 1 September 1992 the public document legally founding the FMLN was signed. Amongst the witnesses of that historical act were Archbishop of San Salvador and Monsignor Gregorio Rosa Chávez and Monsignor Arturo Rivera y Damas. It was not until December 14 of that year, a day before the final formal ceasefire of the armed confrontation, that the TSE (Supreme Electoral Tribunal) admitted the registration of the FMLN, giving it legal identity. And so, more than sixty years of clandestine struggle by the revolutionaries ended and a new historical stage of struggles began within the frame of legality and new institutions generated by the Chapultepec Peace Agreement.
From that day on the FMLN began an intense effort to strengthen the organisation and institutionalization of the party. Municipal and state conventions were held in the lead up to the First Ordinary Convention on September 4, 1993. In spite of the concerted efforts of the right-wing to debilitate the FMLN deeply and strategically, that first Convention was a demonstration of the political vitality that the FMLN enjoyed.
Despite the internal difficulties that prevented the definition of an electoral strategy, in that first Convention the participation of the party in the general elections of March of 1994 was approved, authorizing the National Council to arrange coalitions, pacts and political understandings as necessary, ratifying the candidates for the Legislative Assembly, a document was approved as the base of the programmatic platform and the decision was taken to support the presidential candidacy of Dr Rubén Zamora by the Democratic Convergence and to chose Dr Francisco Lima as a candidate for vice presidency of the Republic. To sum up, the first National Convention politically prepared the FMLN for the electoral battle of March April of 1994.
From those elections the FMLN arose as the second national political force, with electoral and political bases in the 262 municipalities of the country, a completely unexpected result by the right-wing. In those elections the FMLN gained 15 mayorships and 21 parliamentary deputies, with 287 thousand votes, equivalents to the 21.39% of the valid votes.
Independent of the results of those elections, the ERP and the RN chose to follow the path of “social-democracy”, to leave the revolutionary road and to go to the camp of the right, supposedly the “centre”. They took seven of the twenty one deputies and created the PD (Democratic Party). This was only after having tried, in the Extraordinary Convention of August 28, 1994, to seize control of the FMLN and to lead it to the path of “social-democracy” and, having made an effort and failing in that attempt, to disappear from the party and to hope fill the vacancy that the FMLN would leave with the newly created PD.
In September 1994, after the Extraordinary Convention of August 28 that year, it was demonstrated that the multiplication of structures and resources of each party, parallel to those of the FMLN, had entered into conflict with being effective in the political and social struggle, and obstructed the unification process. For this reason, in the special resolution of the Second Ordinary Convention on December 18 1994, it was resolved “to advance with a firm step towards the unification of the FMLN as a democratic, revolutionary pluralist party” and “to call on the affiliates to work with enthusiasm and security to impel the unification of the party and to construct an FMLN, much stronger, more democratic, more connected to the people and their struggles and, mainly, more united”.

Following those directions, in June 1995, after several months of debates, the National Council determined that the FMLN had to be transformed into a party of tendencies and, in addition, into a socialist party. This meant gradually dissolving, during 1995, the structures of each member party and organization of the FMLN and to move to unique structures. The municipal and state conventions that were held, and culminated in the Third Ordinary National Convention on December 17 & 18 1995, were carried out with that perspective. By resolution of this convention, the FMLN stopped being a party of parties and groups, and transformed into a party of tendencies in transition towards a new final stage in the process of construction of a single unified party.

The disappearance of the previous parallel structures of each party allowed the FMLN to prepare a proposal for a strategy of economic and social development (April 1996), the accomplishment in our country of the IV Meeting of the Sao Pablo Forum (July 26-28 1996), the municipal and state conventions that would culminate with the IV Ordinary National Convention, in October 1996. The resolutions of this Convention on the electoral platform and ratification of candidacies for the Legislative Assembly and Municipal Councils, equipped the party with the tools to fight the electoral battles on March 16, 1997.
With the elections for deputies and mayors for March 1997 the FMLN went forward stronger. It obtained an important quota of power legislatively and municipally, and the same with mayors commitments and responsibilities. In this position the FMLN confronted the national challenges and the internal challenges of democratization and modernization, reinforcing its revolutionary, pluralistic and socialist nature.

The strength of the FMLN has rested in the unity and its deepening and the conviction of those who, from within and abroad, continue to see the party as the hope of the people’s yearnings and main factor of the democratic and revolutionary transformations that our country needs.

From July 1997 an intense journey began of municipal and departmental conventions. This culminated with the V Ordinary National Convention, in December of that year. The new authorities arose from this that guided the struggle of the party in the presidential elections of 1999. But, due to the transition phase, in place of the tendencies, in that Convention the party was structured in groups of currents of thought, with divergent opinions about fundamental aspects. About, for example, the democratic revolution project, the political strategy and programs for the presidential elections of 1999, (which affected the electoral victory), the first return of the neo-liberals. In fact two groups, the Socialist Revolutionary current and the Social-Democratic current were formed and structured, and were in dispute for the control of the party, formally in the hands of this last group (those that are called the reformists).
The electoral strategy with which the FMLN confronted the elections for deputies and municipal councils in 2000, was emphatically different to the neo-liberal ARENA policy, and from the strategy applied by the team of previous management (reformists) for the presidential elections of 1999. As a result, the party had more deputies than the government party and won the majority of state premiers and main municipalities of the metropolitan area and governed more than half of the population of the country.
In spite of this, the structuring in groups around “currents of thought”, with inclusive parallel operation, weakened the internal cohesion of the party. In December 2000 the Convention decided to take steps to strengthen the unity of the FMLN by separating out the elective functions of the Convention so that it was dedicated to defining strategies and lines. This left the election of authorities of the party and candidates to positions of popular election in the hands of the members of the party by a secret and direct vote. This was for the sake of advancing in the internal democratisation of the party. At the same time, reforms to the statutes confirmed the revolutionary and socialist character of the party, as well as not recognizing parallel structures of operation of groups or currents of thought.

On November 25, 2001 the first elections of national, departmental and municipal authorities of the party were held by means of secret and direct vote of the members of the party, clearly identified with the main groups – the revolutionaries and “reformists”. The result of the voting was strongly in favor of the revolutionary socialist current, and the reformists were defeated.
The new leadership bodies resulting from the internal elections imprinted a revolutionary character on the management style and the political and social struggle of the party, which had been weakened by internal conflicts. In the FMLN a process of unification and cohesion around the strategy of struggle began, a process that encouraged the decision of reformists to leave the road of the party and the struggle for democratic revolution.
To prepare themselves to secure important advances in the legislative and municipal elections of 2003 and to organize a powerful social movement, and, beside other democratic forces, to gain the presidential victory in the elections of the 2004, are main the strategic tasks for now. The party has begun to take steps to advance in its process of unification, organizationally, but mainly around its program, strategy, and reaffirmation of its revolutionary nature. Consequently within the framework of historical challenges, the aim is to make the party an organization of “social fighters, to work to achieve more members and more revolutionaries” and to “to be more unified” for the sake of the struggle for power.

http://www.fmln.org.sv/historia.php (accessed 3 September 2009) Sitio oficial del Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional – El Salvador

FMLN – Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional / Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
PCS – Partido Comunista de El Salvador / Communist Party of El Salvador
FPL – Fuerzas Popular para Liberation “Farabundo Marti” / Popular Forces of Liberation ” Farabundo Martí”
PRS – Partido de Rovelution Salvadoreno / Party of Salvadoran Revolutión
ERP – Ersito Revolutionario del Pueblo / Revolutionary Army of the People
RN – Resistencia Nacional / National Resistance
PRTC – Partido Revolucionario del Trabajadores de America Central / Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers
CPM – Coordinadora Politica-Militar / Political-Military Coordinator
CRM – Coordinadora Revolucionario de Masas / Revolutionary Coordinator of Masses
BPR – Bloque Popular Revolucionario / Revolutionary Popular Block
FAPU – Frente de Acción Popular Unificado / the Unified Grassroots Action Front
LP-28 – las Ligas Populares 28 de Febrero / 28 of February People’s League
UDN – la Union Democratico Nacionalista / the Nationalistic Democratic Union
UNO – Union Nacional Opositora / National Opposition Union
PDC – Partido Democrata Cristiano / Democratic Christian Party
MNR – Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario / National Revolutionary Movement (of the Socialist International)
MLP – Movimiento de Liberacion Popular / Movement of Popular Liberation
FDS – Frente Democratico Salvadoreno / Salvadoran Democratic Front
MIPTES – Movimiento independiente de profesionales y tecnicos de El Salvador / Independent Movement of Professionals and Technicians of El Salvador
MPSC Movimiento Popular Social Cristiano / Social Christian Peoples Movement
FDR – Frente Democratico Revolucionario / Revolutionary Democratic Front
DRU – Direccion Revolucionaria Unificada / Unified Revolutionary Leadership)
TSE – Tribunal Supremo Electoral / Supreme Electoral Tribunal
PD – Partido Democrata / Democratic Party

By Jacob Wheeler

Share   Digg del.icio.us Reddit Newsvine

The day after the U.S. presidential election, Salvadoran presidential candidate Mauricio Funes congratulated President Obama.

“These winds of change have begun to blow from the United States to refresh the global atmosphere, in need of more democracy and greater social justice,” Funes said in a statement. “The Americans have not been afraid to choose change, as they have staked out the future and not the immobility of the past.”

Funes, who himself is on a nationwide “Caravan of Hope” tour, is the new face of the Faribundo Marti National Liberation front (FMLN). The party—born from five bands of leftist guerrillas during El Salvador’s civil war from 1980 to 1992—is on the verge of winning its first presidential election on March 15.

A popular former TV journalist, Funes enjoys a double-digit lead—as high as 17 percentage points, according to one December poll—over his opponent, Rodrigo Avila of the incumbent right-wing National Republican Alliance (ARENA) party, which has held the presidency for 20 years.

Despite Funes’ poll numbers, the FLMN received mixed results in the national assembly elections on Jan. 18. El frente (or “the front”) as the party is known in El Salvador, gained three seats, giving it 35 out of a total 84. Meanwhile, ARENA lost two seats to give it 32. But the conservative Party of National Conciliation (PCN) won 11 seats, continuing the right-wing coalition’s legislative majority.

FMLN won the mayors’ offices in three other large cities in El Salvador—Soyapango, Santa Tecla and Santa Ana—and increased the number of municipalities it will govern by 90 percent. But the party lost the mayor’s seat in San Salvador, the capital, which incumbent Violeta Menj’var had held since 2005. FMLN had controlled the capital as a strategic stronghold for the past 12 years.

Evidence of possible voter fraud surfaced during the election. FMLN representatives, and groups such as the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), reported that buses of Guatemalan, Honduran and Nicaraguan nationals were detained in border provinces, allegedly on their way to the capital to vote for ARENA. Others, the opposition fears, may have gotten through. CISPES Executive Director Burke Stansbury also believes that ARENA brought rural Salvadorans into the capital to tip the balance there.

As the incumbent party, ARENA controls access to the citizen registry and, before the election, it prevented FMLN and outside observers from comparing the registry to voter rolls.

But Geoff Thale of the Washington Office on Latin America says he doubts that alleged voter fraud made a difference in the capital.

“Violeta Menj’var lost San Salvador because the party was overconfident and failed to run a strong campaign [and] because the mayor’s record in office wasn’t that impressive in terms of municipal services and city management,” Thale says. “Violeta’s predecessors were viewed as effective managers; she wasn’t.”

Thale adds that ARENA presidents have made life difficult for FMLN mayors of San Salvador, “squeezing them on budget issues and being uncooperative on issues like garbage disposal and dump sites.”

Tim Muth, who runs a popular blog called Walking with El Salvador, says the mixed results from the Jan. 18 election may shows signs of a maturing democracy.

“What happened in San Salvador is that a certain portion of the voters appeared to split their votes on National Assembly and mayor,” Muth wrote on his blog. “They were voting based on who they thought (rightly or wrongly) was the best able to govern, rather than voting strictly on party lines.”

FMLN’s motto on Funes’ Caravan of Hope tour has been “Nace la esperanza, viene el cambio” (Hope is born, change is coming). While el frente didn’t expect citizens to actually vote for change in San Salvador’s mayoral election, the party expects its biggest victory to come on March 15.

If poll numbers hold in Funes’ favor, another Latin American democracy will turn to the left.

You think Australian politicians have something to answer for?Well for today’s HACK WITHOUT BORDERS you’re going to hear from 21 year old from Tasmania who’s just returned from being an electoral observer in El Salvador and Venezuela… two countries with a history of violence and political unrest.

click here to go to radio interview